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Authentication systems are designed to give the right person access to an or-
ganization’s information system and to restrict it from the wrong person. Such
systems are designed by IT professionals to protect an organization’s assets
(e.g., the organization’s network, database, or other information). Too often,
such systems are designed around technical specifications without regard for the
end user. We argue that doing so may actually compromise a system’s security.
The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine authentication systems from both
the point of view of the organization and that of the user.
Research has examined and subsequently framed security flaws in a taxon-
omy [1, 2], but the discussion surrounding security mechanisms has been techni-
cal in nature as in Anderson’s formula [3] to determine password strength or the
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve. The ROC curve demonstrates
the performance of an authentication system through plotting false acceptance
rates (allowing an intruder access to the system) against false rejection rates
(failing to correctly authenticate a valid system user) [4].
ROC curves, as a traditional description of an authentication mechanism’s
security, provide insight into how precise a particular authentication mechanism
is, yet they provide no information about this mechanism as experienced by
a user. In this paper, we present a typology of authentication systems that
accounts for both system and user requirements. We then examine and classify
existing authentication mechanisms in light of the typology, and end the paper
with a call for greater consideration of the human element in human-computer
access applications.
2 Authentication System Types
An authentication system must be able to differentiate an authentic user from an
attacker. This aspect of authentication systems focuses on the overall security
provided to a protected asset and can range from open access, such as a public
library where anyone can access the asset, to highly secure military informa-




















systems traditionally varies in direct relation to the protected asset, ranging
from very low (i.e., trusted computing), to very high (e.g., a system requiring a
retinal scan as verification of user identity). The specific authentication mech-
anism used by an organization involves a trade-off between initial and ongoing
authentication costs and the value of the protected asset. Authentication sys-
tem security, therefore, forms the first dimension of our typology, as this is a
necessary element of any system installed to protect an asset. However, because
humans interact with computers, security alone seldom yields a full accounting
of the utility of authentication systems.
Ease of use constitutes a second area of concern for any authentication sys-
tem. Authentication mechanisms that are easy to use require little cognitive
effort from a valid user. Trusted computing mechanisms, for example, involve
granting system access using network or physical location. That is, anyone at a
given location has authorization to directly log into the system. Other easy-to-
use systems might require a simple password. Conversely, some systems require
passwords that are either elaborate and/or mutable, or even phrases in order to
obtain access to the system. Such systems, however, require users to remember
these complex or mutable passwords. This places a high cognitive load upon the
user. Thus, cognitive complexity of the authentication system constitutes the
second dimension of our typology. This dimension is important because if the
authentication system is too cognitively complex, users will develop shortcuts to
alleviate these cognitive demands, such as writing their password on a Post-ItTM
and attaching it to their computer screen. The result of such short-cuts is that
the technically secure authentication system developed by the IT professional
is compromised by the behavior of the user.
Our typology, shown in figure 1 on page 8, describes authentication systems
by their overall security and the level of cognitive complexity imposed upon a
user. While it is simple to acknowledge that an ideal authentication system
would possess a high measure of security while imposing a low degree of cog-
nitive complexity on system users, few authentication mechanisms meet both
criteria. Before addressing the ideal system, we will examine each of the other
authentication system types.
Type 1: High Security, High Cognitive Complexity In situations re-
quiring high levels of security, very sophisticated authentication systems have
been deployed. Unfortunately, increased cognitive demand typically comes
about as a consequence of this sophistication, creating what we call Type 1
authentication systems. Such systems are costly, not only because of the initial
design and implementation costs, but also due to user training and lost produc-
tivity in the event that legitimate users are unable to access the system due to
the cognitive complexity inherent in these systems. It is the user’s inclination
to reduce cognitive load via short-cuts (e.g., through written notes) that is of
greatest concern, as it compromises the very asset security for which the system
was designed.
Authentication mechanisms falling within the Type 1 designation include se-
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cure tunnels, highly complex passwords, and time-synchronized one time pass-
words (OTPs). The use of a secure tunnel–such as a Virtual Private Network
(VPN)–creates cognitive demands through requiring an additional set of creden-
tials for a user to remember. This additional set of credentials, in turn, increases
the overall cognitive complexity of the authentication process. A second exam-
ple of Type 1 authentication is highly complex passwords. These are usually
discussed only in terms of resistance against brute-force attacks, but add their
own problems through saddling users with highly irregular, impersonal, and
wholly bizarre authentication strings. When users are presented with an extra
set of credentials or a password such as AfxZjY50!uzxQ43wRmH6, it is nat-
ural that these users need some form of memory augmentation or assistance,
resulting in potential security breaches.
Designed for remote access use, OTPs, such as S/KeyTM and OPIE (One-
time Passwords In Everything); allow for one-time presentation of disposable
credentials [5]. These credentials form a list, unique across users, and each pass-
word is valid for one and only one presentation, after which only the next pass-
word on the list permits authentication. Time-synchronized OTPs add further
security through automatically expiring credentials after a specified duration
of time. While this makes phishing more difficult, such OTPs place additional
burdens on legitimate users. That is, unlike traditional passwords, they require
that users not only have a record of passwords to present to the authentication
mechanism, but that they are cognizant of their current location within the list.
In conclusion, Type 1 authentication mechanisms attempt to present the
best possible asset security, but do so without regard for valid users. In other
words, these mechanisms are tailored to preventing system access to an invalid
user while paying little attention to the rejection of a valid user. In doing
so, however, Type 1 mechanisms also provide an incentive for a valid asset
user to reduce his/her cognitive load through scripting or storing hard-copies of
passwords or password lists, thus compromising system security. These systems
are inappropriate for the majority of IT installations and can easily overwhelm
many organizations and system users.
Type 2: Low Security, High Cognitive Complexity A second type of au-
thentication system offers little in the way of security to a determined attacker,
while at the same time imposing cumbersome and unwieldy demands upon valid
users. These Type 2 authentication routines represent the ”worst-of-breed” in
authentication mechanisms.
Examples of Type 2 authentication systems include simplistic ”compound”
passwords, Internet Protocol (IP)-restricted OTPs, and any security mechanism
that puts more importance on point-of-entry obfuscation than security. The
common trait shared by Type 2 systems is a cognitive imposition upon a valid
user of an asset that far exceeds the security offered.
Simplistic compound passwords are made up of two words joined together.
It is quite possible for a user, when faced with an 8-character minimum length
requirement, to present simple compound passwords (e.g. forkorange or
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jim1947). Such passwords can supply a measure of security, but unless the
password is complex (Type 1), these passwords are fairly easy to uncover and
can also be difficult for users to recall.
While offering greater security than simplistic compound passwords, IP-
restricted OTPs are not immune to phishing attacks given that potential hackers
have time on their side. While time-sensitive OTPs (Type 1) mutate with
the passage of time, IP-restricted one-time passwords do not; furthermore, IP
addresses are easily spoofed. Consequently, an unused password allows invalid
users time to launch a brute force attack against the password. Moreover,
because credentials ultimately mutate with each presentation, users also tend
to maintain their own ”hard copy” of their password lists–and this paper list,
consequently, may reveal precisely which password is active at a given time.
In conclusion, Type 2 systems are the most insidious and inherently danger-
ous of the four types as they lull personnel into a false sense of security while
simultaneously inconveniencing system users. In other words, they represent
systems that evoke security through obscurity.
Type 3: Low Security, Low Cognitive Complexity A third type of
authentication system provides for low overall security, but at a low cognitive
cost to users. Although not recommended where security is vital, these Type 3
mechanisms are very user friendly.
Examples within this category include trusted computing approaches, simple
passwords, relatively weak biometrics such as the examination of a fingerprint,
and system-tethered hardware dongles. In trusted computing there are no cog-
nitive demands on the user as asset access is granted to anyone connecting to the
asset from a particular physical or network location. Simple passwords, while
conceivably user-specific, can be easily broken because users tend to pick pass-
words that are either trivial (e.g. 1234) or otherwise non-novel (e.g., objects,
names, etc.). Consequently, the level of protection afforded an asset guarded by
a Type 3 authentication system is low. Simple biometrics, such as a fingerprint,
provide greater security than simple passwords but are not fool-proof. For exam-
ple, Matsumoto et al. demonstrated the inability of fingerprint authentication
mechanisms to differentiate between ”live” fingers and ”false” fingers comprised
of gelatin [6]. Finally, a ”system-tethered” hardware dongle is a device that,
by virtue of either its presence or contents, provides authentication. These
dongles may be used in coordination with another authentication mechanism
or alone. Examples include Bluetooth or RFID badges that provide authenti-
cation through their presence, or a hardware device that presents credentials
stored on the device itself. Yet this solution is prone to circumvention as users
may perpetually leave hardware dongles plugged in or otherwise accessible.
In conclusion, Type 3 authentication mechanisms are very convenient from
the user’s perspective but provide little system security. Consequently, this
category of authentication mechanisms should only be used where user access,
rather than asset security, is the primary objective.
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Type 4: High Security, Low Cognitive Complexity Finally, a fourth
type of authentication system confers a high degree of system security while
presenting a relatively low cognitive load to a user. These Type 4 systems are
well suited for situations requiring high security.
Authentication mechanisms within this classification include ”soft” biomet-
rics, biometrics via retinal scanning, and system-invariant hardware dongles.
”Soft” biometric mechanisms allow for a non-invasive examination of something
that the user is (or does) as opposed to biometric mechanisms that leave be-
hind latent information (e.g. fingerprints). Recently, keyboard input metrics,
e.g., rhythm, tempo, etc., have been presented as examples of ”soft” biometric
mechanisms [7, 8]. Such ”soft” biometric initiatives show promise and enjoy
reduced cost through utilizing pre-existing hardware in the organization. Reti-
nal scanners, in turn, are quick and intuitive, and benefit from properties of
the retina. Biometric authentication via retinal scanning has traditionally been
recognized as an exceedingly robust and secure access control mechanism, but
also carries with it the advantage of a lack of physical, latent evidence of past
users, unlike fingerprints. System-invariant hardware dongles are external de-
vices that present a method to authenticate without directly storing the required
credentials. The best example of a system-invariant hardware dongle comes in
the form of challenge-response cryptographically-strong systems (e.g. RSA’s Se-
cureID system [9]), wherein the supplied information mutates and does not con-
stitute the entire authentication mechanism. Along these lines, use of a 2-factor
authentication token that does not carry any immediately ”useful” informa-
tion regarding the user, the token’s use, or the system against which the token
authenticates, tends to create an authentication scenario keeping with Type 4
systems, particularly for local log-in and some corporate networks. However,
even these are not entirely immune to attack when used for Internet authenti-
cation [10]. Specifically, RSA’s SecureID system generates a new authentication
code every 60 seconds using a dongle-specific key. A user then uses this code
along with a personal identification number (PIN) to authenticate. As the deci-
sion to authenticate or deny a user is made at the server, the token itself cannot
be tampered with to send an ”authenticate” signal to the system. Thus, the
authentication system security is strong, while cognitive complexity to a user
is low, as the PIN is reasonably short, and the longer code is provided through
the token.
In conclusion, the key distinguishing feature of Type 4 authentication sys-
tems is the uniqueness and inherent complexity of their authentication creden-
tials, either through personal identifiers (retinal scan) or through combining
two different, independent mechanisms (dongle plus a PIN). This provides asset
security without unduly imposing upon system users.
3 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to develop and describe a typology of authenti-
cation systems. Accordingly, we classified examples of existing authentication
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mechanisms within the typology. We recognize that our typology does not take
into account every authentication mechanism. Moreover, within-cell variations
are likely. Not every authentication mechanism within a given system type will
provide exactly the same levels of security and cognitive complexity, but these
differences, both within- and between-cell, are testable. For example, one could
test the cognitive complexity of an authentication system by users’ ability to
recall their password across sessions. Because what is cognitively complex may
vary from person to person, such tests should include individual differences as
potential moderating or mediating variables. One could also test the system’s
security via users’ willingness to divulge their passwords to third-party users
(unable to log in) and through one-way observation to see if users write their
passwords down in order to recall them.
Our typology suggests that successful authentication systems must provide
an appropriate balance between the need for security and the cognitive demands
placed on valid users. If security is not an issue, then authentication should fall
within Type 3 of the typology. Consideration of individual differences with re-
spect to system authentication in high security environments leaves two options.
One could strive to minimize the demands placed on users (i.e., Type 4 systems)
or one could work to ensure that valid users have the cognitive capacity nec-
essary to handle cognitively complex authentication mechanisms (i.e., Type 1
systems). Thus, the balance between security and users’ abilities could be met
either through technical solutions or through selection and training.
IT professionals recognize that the level of security in controlling system
access must be balanced against the cost of such authentication systems. Some-
times the value of the asset one is trying to protect simply does not warrant
elaborate authentication systems. We argue that the psychology of the user
must also be considered. Too often technical requirements of these systems are
pursued in the absence of user needs and requirements. Academically, there
is already a movement to merge these two perspectives through the develop-
ment of human computer interaction (HCI) programs; a movement we believe
is needed.
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